Aggregate and Welfare Effects of Redistribution of Wealth Under Inflation and Price-Level Targeting by Césaire A. Meh et al.
Working Paper/Document de travail
2008-31
Aggregate and Welfare Effects of 
Redistribution of Wealth Under Inﬂation 
and Price-Level Targeting
by Césaire A. Meh, José-Víctor Ríos-Rull, and Yaz Terajima
www.bank-banque-canada.caBank of Canada Working Paper 2008-31
September 2008
Aggregate and Welfare Effects of
Redistribution of Wealth Under Inﬂation
and Price-Level Targeting
by
Césaire A. Meh1, José-Víctor Ríos-Rull2, and Yaz Terajima1
1Monetary and Financial Analysis Department
Bank of Canada
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0G9
cmeh@bankofcanada.ca
yterajima@bankofcanada.ca
2University of Minnesota, PENN
FRB Mpls, CAERP, CEPR, NBER
vr0j@umn.edu
Bank of Canada working papers are theoretical or empirical works-in-progress on subjects in
economics and ﬁnance. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors.
No responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank of Canada.
ISSN 1701-9397 © 2008 Bank of Canadaii
Acknowledgements
We thank participants in Demography Workshop at the Bank of Canada, Conference on Deﬁning
Price Stability at the European Central Bank, 2008 Midwest Macro Meetings, 2008 Canadian
Economic Association Meetings, 2008 North American Econometric Society Summer Meetings,
2008 Far Eastern and South Asian Econometric Society Summer Meetings, 2008 Computing in
Economics and Finance Conference, 2008 Society of Economic Dynamics, and the Bank of
Japan. We also thank Matthieu Darracq-Paries for discussing the paper at the ECB conference,
and Ian Christensen, Allan Crawford, Martin Eichenbaum, Walter Engert and Martin Schneider
for comments. We thank David Xiao Chen and Thomas Carter for excellent research assistance.iii
Abstract
Since the work of Doepke and Schneider (2006a) and Meh and Terajima (2008), we know that
inﬂation causes major redistribution of wealth – between households and the government,
between nationals and foreigners, and between households within the same country. Two types of
monetary policy, inﬂation targeting (IT) and price level targeting (PT), have very different
implications for the price level path subsequent to a price-level shock, and consequently, have
different redistributional properties which is what we explore in this paper. For Canada, we show
that the magnitude of redistributions of an unexpected 1% price-level increase under IT is about
three times larger than under PT. Households’ and foreigners’ wealth losses from a price level
increase is matched by the gains of the government. Even though this redistribution is zero-sum,
we observe positive effects on GDP due to the wealth loss, the lower value of the debt and its
associated ﬁscal adjustment, and the non-linear effects on work effort of the redistribution of
wealth across households. Finally, the direction of the change in the weighted welfare of
households depends on the ﬁscal policy.
JEL classiﬁcation: D31, E21, E31, E44, E52, E63
Bank classiﬁcation: Economic models; Monetary policy framework; Sectoral balance sheet;
Inﬂation: costs and beneﬁts; Inﬂation targets; Inﬂation and prices
Résumé
Depuis les travaux de Doepke et Schneider (2006a) et de Meh et Terajima (2008), on sait que
l’inﬂation entraîne une redistribution notable de la richesse, entre les ménages et l’État, entre les
résidents et les non-résidents et entre les ménages d’un même pays. Deux types de politique
monétaire – l’une axée sur la poursuite de cibles d’inﬂation, et l’autre, sur celle de cibles déﬁnies
en fonction du niveau des prix – ont des répercussions très différentes sur l’évolution du niveau
des prix après une variation inattendue de ce dernier, et donc des effets de redistribution
dissemblables. Ce sont ces effets qui intéressent les auteurs. Ceux-ci montrent que, au Canada, les
effets de redistribution d’une hausse imprévue de1%d un i v e a ud e sprix sont environ trois fois
plus élevés si l’on prend pour cible le taux d’inﬂation plutôt que le niveau des prix. Les pertes des
ménages et des non-résidents attribuables à une élévation du niveau des prix sont compensées par
les gains de l’État. Même si les pertes et les gains s’annulent, le produit intérieur brut augmente
par suite de la baisse de la richesse, du recul de la dette en termes réels et de l’assainissement
concomitant des ﬁnances publiques ainsi qu’à la faveur des effets non linéaires de la redistributioniv
de la richesse entre les ménages sur l’offre de travail. Enﬁn, le sens de la variation du bien-être
pondéré des ménages dépend de la politique budgétaire.
Classiﬁcation JEL : D31, E21, E31, E44, E52, E63
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Modèles économiques; Cadre de la politique monétaire; Bilan
sectoriel; Inﬂation : coûts et avantages; Cibles en matière d’inﬂation; Inﬂation et prix1 Introduction
Doepke and Schneider (2006a) and Meh and Terajima (2008) have shown that inﬂation causes major
redistribution of wealth as it erodes the real value of nominal assets and liabilities while leaving
real assets unaﬀected. This is due to diﬀerences in portfolio composition between households, as
well as the existence of nominally denominated government debt and the fact that the domestic
economy’s net position with respect to the rest of the world in nominal instruments is non-zero.
Some households, mostly young, have real assets and nominal liabilities (mostly mortgages), while
others, mostly old and high income, have a large share of their wealth in nominal assets such as
long-term bonds and pension beneﬁts. Portfolio composition diﬀers not only with regard to whether
instruments are real or nominal, but also with regard to the maturity structure of nominal holdings.
While a sizeable number of central banks have embraced inﬂation targeting (IT) as their oﬃcial
modus operandi, price-level targeting (PT) is considered a serious contender. The diﬀerences between
these regimes are non trivial. The main diﬀerence is that under IT past “mistakes” are ignored, while
under PT they are corrected. This results in diﬀerent price level paths; under IT, there is a permanent
deviation from the pre-shock path, while under PT the price level eventually returns to its initial
path. Short-term nominal assets (e.g., cash), which are depreciated at the instantaneous rate of
inﬂation, and real assets (e.g., houses, business capital), which are not aﬀected by inﬂation, fare
equally under IT and PT. However, long-term nominal assets, which are depreciated by the ratio of
the current price to the price level at the time of maturity, fare diﬀerently under these frameworks.
More speciﬁcally, under PT, gains and losses on long-term nominal claims are attenuated relative to
those under the IT regime since the initial price shock is oﬀ-set over time as the monetary authority
seeks to return the price level to its pre-shock path.
In this paper, using Canadian data, we consider the eﬀects that arise under IT and PT through
the redistributional channel as nominal holdings are revalued following an unexpected surge in the
price level.1 More speciﬁcally, we address two questions. First, through the detailed documentation
of nominal portfolios of diﬀerent agents in the economy, we assess the potential redistributions of
unexpected inﬂation under IT and PT regimes. Second, we quantify the aggregate and welfare
implications of these redistributions under both regimes.
With respect to the ﬁrst question, we ﬁnd that the size of redistributions is large and consistently
higher under IT than PT. Redistributions occur due to the fact that the portfolios of agents are
diﬀerent. Moreover, the diﬀerence between the two monetary policy regimes arises because the use
of long-term assets and liabilities is prevalent in the economy.2 The young middle-class and the poor
are net nominal borrowers due mostly to mortgage liability holdings, a long-term liability, while
the rich and the old are net savers due to pension and long-term bond holdings, long-term assets.
1The Canadian data are used at least for two reasons. First, Canada already implements inﬂation targeting. Second,
a review of the monetary policy framework is currently underway and a price-level targeting policy is considered as
one option. However, insights of the paper are applicable to other countries.
2As mentioned, a price-level shock does not aﬀect long-term nominal claims as dramatically under PT while short-
term nominal claims fare similarly under both regimes.
1The middle-aged are also savers due to pensions. Among diﬀerent sectors, the government is a net
nominal borrower due mostly to long-term bonds while the household sector as a whole and the
foreign sector are net nominal lenders. Based on these portfolios, a one-time positive 1% price-level
shock lasting one period leads to a gross redistribution among households of 5.5% of GDP or $76
billion.3 In net value, under IT, the household sector loses wealth equivalent to 0.4% of GDP or
$5.5 billion which is 2.7 times larger than under PT. In addition, on average under both regimes, the
young poor, the young middle-class, and the government are winners, while the middle-aged workers,
the old and the rich are the losers.
Concerning the second question, we use an overlapping-generations model with additional hetero-
geneity within households in each cohort due to diﬀerences in labour productivity proﬁle as well as
in propensities to work and save. In analyzing the eﬀect of redistributions on aggregate output and
welfare we incorporate in our analysis the role ﬁscal policy plays in transferring the government’s
windfall gain or loss to households. With a positive price-level shock, the government’s nominal
debt decreases in its real value, an improvement in the government’s portfolio. We consider several
ﬁscal policies that re-balance the government budget after the initial change in the real value of
government debts. The government transfers the windfall gain through a reduction in labour taxes
over several periods, a lump sum transfer, and a transfer to retirees.
Our main ﬁndings on aggregate output are that there are non-zero eﬀects and that these eﬀects
are larger under IT than PT. We show that despite the fact that the redistribution shock is zero sum
across agents in the economy, the aggregate eﬀects on output are non-zero under either monetary
policy regime. Because winners (net borrowers) during a surprise inﬂation episode are younger and
relatively poorer than losers (net lenders), the incentives to work and save are aﬀected in ways that are
not oﬀset during aggregation. That is, redistributions generate wealth eﬀects on household labour
supply decisions. When a household receives a negative (positive) redistribution, the household
increases (decreases) its labour supply to make up for the wealth loss (gain). Since households are
heterogeneous in the age, the productivity and the preferences, their labour supply responses will also
be heterogenous. More redistributions under IT lead to larger responses by households to generate
larger aggregate eﬀects.
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the aggregate output eﬀects from an unexpected price level surge are
greater under IT than PT. For example, when the government cuts the labour tax rate to reallocate
its windfall gains to households, a one-time 1% price-level shock leads to an increase in output of
0.1% of GDP or $1.4 billion under IT, while under PT, the increase is less than one-third of that
under IT. Using the standard measure of utilitarian aggregate welfare of households alive at the time
of the shock, we ﬁnd that weighted aggregate welfare of households depends on how ﬁscal policy
transfers the government’s windfall gain to households. If the ﬁscal policy favors workers (i.e., a
tax cut on labour income), weighted average welfare worsens with the price-level shock by -0.06% of
consumption under IT and by -0.03% under PT. On the other hand, if ﬁscal policy favors retirees
3Even though our discussion throughout the paper focuses mainly on a positive 1% shock, our framework is not
limited to it. Shocks can be of diﬀerent magnitudes and signs. The analyses of diﬀerent shocks are conducted as a part
of sensitivity analysis.
2(i.e., an increase in transfer), welfare increases by 0.20% and 0.09% under IT and PT, respectively.
We also use our model to address a hypothetical question with respect to demographic changes
associated with longer life spans that are expected in 50 years in the future. We analyze how
these changes aﬀect the aggregate and welfare results. With longer life spans, households’ savings
increase. In turn, this leads to larger redistributions and hence larger aggregate and welfare eﬀects.
Based on the 1% price-level shock under the labour tax adjustment ﬁscal policy, output increases
almost twice as much compared to the economy with the current demographic structure. At the
same time, weighted average welfare turns positive in contrast to the negative result with the current
demographic structure. This is a result of larger tax cuts made possible by larger government windfall
gains. Alternatively, under the transfer to retirees ﬁscal policy, both output responses and average
welfare changes are qualitatively similar although the magnitudes are smaller with demographic
changes for both IT and PT.
The documentation of nominal portfolios of agents in the United States is done by Doepke and
Schneider (2006a), and a framework for quantitatively studying the redistributional eﬀects of inﬂation
is developed by Doepke and Schneider (2006b). In this sense, our work is closely related to theirs,
but they do not consider monetary policy regimes and the diﬀerential eﬀects under IT and PT. Their
focus is on the eﬀects of inﬂation in general. Comparing our work and theirs empirically, one of the
main diﬀerences between the portfolios in Canada and the United States concerns that of middle-
aged, middle-class households. In Canada, middle-aged, middle-class households are net lenders
while in the United States they are borrowers. Even though Doepke and Schneider (2006b) does not
study monetary policy regimes, some of their results can be compared to ours qualitatively. In our
quantitative work based on a positive price-level shock, the diﬀerence in the portfolio of middle-aged,
middle-class households is shown to generate a positive aggregate output eﬀect as well as a negative
average welfare eﬀect. These results contrast sharply with those of Doepke and Schneider, which
connect positive price-level shocks with negative output eﬀects and positive welfare eﬀects.
There exists a literature studying the beneﬁts and costs of IT and PT (see for example, Gaspar,
Smets, and Vestin (2007), Ambler (2007), Cote (2007), Vestin (2006), Svensson (1999), Duguay
(1994)). However, this literature does not account for the redistributional eﬀects of price level
changes and its macroeconomic consequences under PT and IT. There are other related studies
on redistributions. For Canada in the 1970s, Maslove and Rowley (1975) assess the redistributional
consequences of inﬂation but focus on the expenditure eﬀects that arise from the consumption pattern
of households while we focus on the wealth eﬀects that come from the valuation of nominal assets.
The paper is also related to earlier literature, such as Bach and Stephenson (1974) and Cukierman,
Lennan, and Papadia (1985), who document redistribution of wealth in the 1970s in other countries.
However, they do not conduct their analysis within a uniﬁed framework where direct and indirect
positions are considered together. Our focus on both sectoral and household data also distinguishes
our approach from theirs. There is also a literature that considers the welfare costs of inﬂation in
monetary models where inﬂation aﬀects the distribution of wealth (see Albanesi (2007), Erosa and
Ventura (2002) and Cukierman, Lennan, and Papadia (1985)). Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo
(2006) investigate the ﬁscal consequences of currency crises in emerging market economies. Their
3ﬁndings suggest that the devaluation of nominal government debt is a more important source of
government revenue than seigniorage. Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1998) show that because
of incomplete indexation of the tax system and the transfer program, moderate inﬂation has large
eﬀects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes in detail how IT and
PT have diﬀerent redistributional impacts. Section 3 calculates the extent of redistribution based
on nominal and real portfolios held by Canadian households and by the government and the foreign
sectors. Section 4 describes the overlapping generations model and deﬁnes equilibrium under both
regimes. Section 5 discusses the calibration of the model and describes how agents are aﬀected when
the price level experiences a 1% shock. Section 6 discusses the aggregate and welfare results of
the price-level shock under various ﬁscal and monetary regimes as well as some sensitivity analyses.
In Section 7, we analyze the eﬀects of the same price-level shock but under an expected future
demographic structure with a higher fraction of retirees. Section 8 concludes.
2 Methodology to compute the redistribution of wealth under IT and PT
In this section, we describe the method we use to compute the extent of redistribution of wealth
from a permanent price-level shock or equivalently a transitory inﬂation shock. The extent of the
inﬂation-induced redistribution of wealth depends on the monetary policy in place. Put diﬀerently,
the size of the redistribution of wealth depends on inﬂation expectations which are aﬀected by the
policy. Hence, we explicitly incorporate a monetary policy, inﬂation targeting (IT) or price-level
targeting (PT), in our framework by capturing the diﬀerence in the post-shock price-level path.
An unanticipated rise in the price level redistributes wealth from lenders to borrowers, and this
is because such an increase in the price level lowers the real value of nominal assets and liabilities.
Using the framework in this section and the nominal portfolio documentation in Section 3.2, we will
assess the magnitude of the redistribution of wealth by computing the present value gain or loss of
such a price-level shock for each sector as well as diﬀerent groups of households under IT and PT.
Under IT, bygones are bygones, and the price level remains at its new path after a price level shock.
On the other hand, under PT, a credible central bank brings the price level back to its original path.
Given that the unanticipated price level shock will be brought back to the initial path under PT,
the redistribution of wealth would be on average smaller under PT than IT.
2.1 Inﬂation targeting
Suppose there is a one-time transitory unanticipated inﬂation increase of ∆ that leads to a surprise
jump in the price level. Under IT, the central bank does not bring the price level back and therefore
the price level will remain at its new path after the shock. This surprise jump in the price level
leaves nominal interest rates unchanged. Redistribution of wealth emerges since a jump in the price
4level reduces proportionally the real value of nominal claims.
Let us now discuss formally the present value gain or loss of a one-time transitory surprise
inﬂation. Deﬁne it+n
t to be the nominal return on an n−year nominal zero-coupon bond at date t.
Let Vt(n) = exp(−in
t+n) be the present value of one dollar at date t+n before the price level shock of
∆. Because the nominal term structure does not change under IT after the surprise price-level shock
at time t, the new time t present value of one dollar due at time t+n is given by V IT
t (n) deﬁned as
follows
V IT
t (n) = exp(−it+n
t )exp(−∆)
= Vt(n)exp(−∆). (1)
Equation (1) shows that the present value of a one dollar claim at time t is lowered by exp(−∆) and
that such a present value is independent of the maturity of that claim. Therefore, the present value
gain or loss GIT is given by the following expression
GIT
t = Vt(n) − V IT
t (n) = Vt(n)[exp(−∆) − 1]. (2)
As equation (2) shows, the net present value gain or loss is independent of of the maturity of a
position and depends on the size of the shock and the size of the overall position. The gain is,
indeed, proportional to the net position with a coeﬃcient of exp(−∆)−1. If GIT > 0 then there is a
gain from the price level shock and otherwise there is a loss. In the next section, equation (2) will be
used to compute the size of the redistribution under IT. More speciﬁcally, the gain/loss of a sector
or an individual household at a given point in time, will be computed by multiplying the overall net
nominal position documented in the previous section by the factor of exp(−∆) − 1.
2.2 Price level targeting
An important diﬀerence between IT and PT is that the central bank commits to bringing the price
level back to its initial path after the shock. Under a PT regime, assuming that the central bank
is credible, agents in the economy expect that the central bank will bring the price level back to its
targeted path after H periods, where the target horizon is given by H. Assume for simplicity that
the central bank follows a linear rule (which is publicly known) with a constant slope ∆0 to bring





To bring the price level back after an unanticipated rise in inﬂation, the central bank must generate
inﬂation that is lower than the slope of the targeted price-level path. For example, if central bank
targets full price stability (that is, a constant targeted price level), the central bank must create
deﬂation in order to bring the price level back.
5Since PT does not currently exist in Canada, we can think of our experiment of redistribution of
wealth under PT as follows. In period t, there is a surprise one-time credible announcement of a PT
regime starting from t and at the same time there is a surprise one-time transitory increase in the
price level. After the surprise price level shock and the surprise announcement of the new regime,
bond prices will instantly change to account for the new inﬂation path or price level path. Assume
that the Fisher equation holds ex ante: it+n
t = rt+n
t + πn
t , where rt+n
t is the real interest rate and
πn
t is the cumulative expected inﬂation. Supposing that the real interest rate does not change after
the shock, the nominal n−year return is b it+n
t = it+n
t +∆0 min{n,H}. In this case, the time t present
value of a dollar at t + n becomes
V PT(n,H) = exp(−∆)exp(−b it+n
t )
= exp(−∆)exp(−it+n










Using equation (4), we derive the present value gain or loss GPT(n,H) of a given position of maturity
n under PT with a target horizon H:











The total present value gain or loss GPT(H) under a PT regime with a target horizon equal to H



















Equations (4)-(6) show that the size of the present value gain or loss from a price level shock depends
not only on the size of the position but also on the interaction between the target horizon H and
the maturity structure n of assets and liabilities. More speciﬁcally, equation (6) illustrates that the
contribution of a particular instrument to the total gain or loss from a price level shock depends on
three elements in addition to the size of the shock: (i) the size of the position, (ii) the maturity of
that position, and (iii) the target horizon used by the central bank. Note that the dependence of the
present value gain under PT on the maturity structure contrasts with IT.
We assume that once a position comes to maturity at time t+n, the funds are reinvested at the
6real interest rate.4 For example, if the target horizon is high (n < H) then


















In this case, only nominal assets and liabilities with maturity n = 1,...,H − 1 will be aﬀected
by the shock. For a given target horizon, H, gains or losses will be smaller for longer maturity
positions. This comes from the fact that GPT(n,H) is decreasing in n in absolute values. Moreover,
limH→+∞ GPT(n,H) = GIT. This means that, as the target horizon under PT goes to inﬁnity, the
resulting price-level path converges towards that under IT. Put diﬀerently, for a given maturity n,
gains or losses are larger for longer target horizons (GPT is an increasing function of H in absolute
values).
Let’s now discuss the case where the target horizon is small (n ≥ H). The time t present value
of a dollar at time t + n and the gain or the loss are given by







GPT(n,H) = 0. (10)
The present value of nominal assets and liabilities of maturity n ≥ H remains unchanged. This is
because the price level will be brought back by the central bank by the time the instruments come
to maturity. Therefore, if the target horizon is short, longer term-to-maturity assets and liabilities
are more likely to be unaﬀected by the price level shock.5
3 Redistribution based on nominal assets and liabilities
Given that we have a methodology to calculate the size of redistributions for a given nominal instru-
ment, we now turn to the documentation of portfolios of agents in the economy in Canada and the
calculation of the redistribution based on the existing portfolio.
4Actually, for the wealth eﬀects we are investigating, the precise manner in which short-term instruments are
protected from inﬂation after coming to maturity is irrelevant. In the real world, it is possible to see funds generated
by the short instrument be consumed, or be reinvested at a higher nominal interest rate or at the real interest rate.
Moreover, because the central bank is credible and agents in the economy have perfect foresight, the wealth eﬀects are
exactly the same whether long-term bonds are held to maturity or sold early at loss.
5This section suggests that the target horizon under price level has important implications for the choice of maturity
structure of assets and liabilities.
73.1 Construction of net nominal positions
Our methods and speciﬁc variables used for constructing net nominal positions are detailed in Meh
and Terajima (2008). Hence, we brieﬂy discuss them in this section while the resulting portfolios
will be discussed in Section 3.2. We deﬁne nominal assets and liabilities to be all nominal securities
denominated in Canadian dollars. We observe four sectors of the economy: household, government,
foreign and business. Since the business sector is entirely owned by other sectors through equity, we
deﬁne household, government and foreign sector to be the three end-user sectors. The redistribution
eﬀects on the business sector are indirectly carried over to these end-user sectors through the equity
claim they hold against businesses. The computation of the net nominal position involves the use of
indirect positions (through equity holdings) of a sector or a group of households. Therefore the net
nominal position (NNP) of a sector or a household group is the diﬀerence between the market value
of its nominal assets and liabilities, both direct and indirect.
Data Our main data source for computing the positions of the government, foreign, household and
corporate sectors is the National Balance Sheet Accounts (NBSA) in 2005, as provided by Statis-
tics Canada.6 The NBSA documents the ownership of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial assets by sector.
Speciﬁcally, it details assets and liabilities for persons and unincorporated businesses, corporations
(including investment intermediaries), governments (at the federal, provincial and municipal levels),
and non-residents (including foreign-owned banks and corporations). Within our study, we title these
the household, business, government and foreign sectors, respectively. Our three end-users are the
household, government and foreign sectors since the assets and liabilities of the business sector are
distributed to these end-users in proportion to their equity holdings.
For detailed household nominal positions, we use the 2005 Survey of Financial Security (SFS),
which provides microdata on income and wealth collected by Statistics Canada.7 Based on the equity
holdings, we assign the assets and liabilities of the business sector to the government, foreign and
household sectors and to household groups. Values of assets and liabilities are given at market value
in the NBSA by Statistics Canada. For ﬁnancial positions, the total values of liability-side bonds
and equity have been estimated directly in the NBSA; asset-side ﬁgures are then linked to these
estimates. The market value for shares of all listed companies is based on information taken from
the exchanges and reconciled to survey data. Assets of the major domestic institutional investors
(e.g., pension funds, segregated funds of life insurance companies, mutual funds) are converted to
market values based on data in Statistics Canada surveys. The market value of the non-resident
sector’s assets is estimated by Statistics Canada using microdata in a debt inventory system, as are
domestic bond liabilities. Therefore, unlike Doepke and Schneider (2006a), we do not impute market
values from payment streams within our dataset.
6Brief descriptions of the data sets used in the paper are attached in Appendix A. For more details, see Meh and
Terajima (2008).
7The 2005 SFS is the latest one available.
8Categories of nominal instruments and term structures For our purposes, any ﬁnancial instru-
ments denominated in Canadian dollars are considered nominal unless their returns are indexed to
inﬂation. Non-ﬁnancial instruments and those denominated in foreign currencies are real.8 We deﬁne
four broad categories of nominal ﬁnancial instruments: Short-term Instruments, Bonds, Mortgages,
Employer Pension Plans. For the purpose of our study, all nominal assets and liabilities of sectors
and household types are assigned to one of these categories.9
The short-term instrument category includes assets and liabilities with a term-to-maturity of
one year or less, i.e., domestic currency and bank deposits, other deposits, consumer credit, Canada
short-term paper, other short-term paper, trade receivables and payables, and reserve positions and
drawing rights at the IMF. For mortgages, we assume that they mature according to the distribution
over the term of mortgages estimated for ﬁxed-rate mortgages from the 2005 Canadian Financial
Monitor, an annual household survey conducted by Ipsos Reid.10 The bond category comprises non-
mortgage and non-pension ﬁnancial instruments with maturity greater than one year and includes
the following items: bank loans, loans from other institutions, Canada bonds, provincial bonds,
municipal bonds, corporate and other bonds, government claims, and other ﬁnancial instruments
that have not been assigned to the mortgage, pension or short categories. As for the term structure
of bonds, we employ a distribution over terms-to-maturity for bonds. We derive this distribution
from annual data on the maturity and face value of federal government debt outstanding in 2005 as
detailed in Meh and Terajima (2008).
Finally, we distinguish among three types of Employer Pension Plans: non-indexed deﬁned ben-
eﬁt, indexed deﬁned beneﬁt, and deﬁned contribution. Deﬁned beneﬁt plans pay the beneﬁciary
based on a formula (usually involving years of service and average earnings) while payments from
deﬁned contribution plans depend on the performance of the portfolio in which contributions have
been invested. Partially indexed deﬁned beneﬁt plans are taken as non-indexed in our analysis. Fully
indexed plans are treated as real assets. For the term structure of non-indexed deﬁned beneﬁt plans,
we assumed that they pay nominally ﬁxed beneﬁts on an annual basis, beginning at retirement and
ending at death, again, as detailed in Meh and Terajima (2008).
8Some positions reported in the NBSA and SFS are deﬁned to include both domestic and foreign currency-
denominated instruments without further detail. We have estimated currency-speciﬁc components using a procedure
explained in Meh and Terajima (2008).
9Assets held within Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs) are assigned to one of these categories. In the
2005 SFS data, the values of assets within RRSPs are documented and therefore we assign RRSP assets to short-term
instruments, bonds and equities.
10The term of mortgages is the period after which the mortgage rate is re-adjusted to the prevailing market rate.
Hence, for our exercises, the term is taken to be the maturity of mortgages.
93.2 Composition of net nominal positions across economic agents
3.2.1 Household types
For household types, we consider six age groups: ≤35 years, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65, 66-75, and ≥76.
Within each age group, we consider three economic classes: rich, middle-class and poor. The classes
are deﬁned as follows. The top 10% of households in net worth are characterized as rich. The rest of
the households (90% of all households) are sorted by income ignoring their net worth. Then among
these households, those (70% of all households) with higher income are characterized as middle class
and the remaining households (20% of all households) as poor.
Table 1 describes the net nominal positions and nominal portfolios for diﬀerent income classes
and age groups from the 2005 SFS.11 It shows that, overall, young households are net borrowers
and old households are net lenders. There is, however, heterogeneity within age groups in terms
of borrowing and lending. For example, in the 36-45 age group, the middle class and poor borrow
while the rich save. In fact, all rich age groups are net savers except for the youngest. The positive
net nominal positions of the elderly middle class are large, and the oldest middle class’s ratio of
net nominal savings to net worth (33.88%) is the highest, followed by the oldest rich (29.82%). In
contrast, middle-class households under 36 have the highest ratio of net nominal debt to net worth (-
89.44%), followed by the youngest poor (-52.11%). The poor on average remain nominal net-debtors
later in life than other income classes. For example, poor households are borrowers until age 56
while middle-class households have stopped being net debtors by age 46 and only the youngest rich
households are net debtors.
Poor households save mainly through short-term nominal instruments. The youngest poor cohort
holds debts in mortgages (-37.77% of net worth) and bonds (-37.66%).12 In older age groups, the
poor save in bonds and, to a lesser extent, pensions. Rich households save in bonds, particularly
the two middle-age cohorts, with about 12% of net worth in these instruments. They hold savings
in mortgages reﬂecting the business sector’s mortgage lending through their large equity holdings.
Pension holdings relative to net worth are not large for this group, similar to poor households, and
these holdings are negative before retirement age, reﬂecting indirect positions in the business sector’s
pension liabilities.13
The middle-aged and old middle class use more pensions in the form of non-indexed deﬁned
beneﬁt assets for their savings, compared to their poor and rich counterparts who rely more on short-
term instruments and bonds respectively. For example, pensions are the largest savings category for
households in the 56-65 and 66-75 age brackets, where they account for 19.36% and 14.11% of net
11Real asset positions are also shown in the table. Note that the net nominal position and the real position add up
to 100%.
12The negative bond holdings of the poor young households reﬂect their student loans.
13These households own the largest proportion of the sector’s equity holdings and so have the largest indirect
positions. Please see Meh and Terajima (2008) for details.
10worth respectively. Young middle-class households are the most indebted in nominal positions, and
most of their direct borrowing occurs through mortgages. The ratio of their overall net nominal debt
to net worth is 89.44% while the ratio of mortgage debt to net worth is 81.62%.14 The young middle
class are similar to the poor young in holding negative bond positions largely due to student loans.
Comparing the observations in Canada and the United States (Table 1 in Doepke and Schneider
(2006a)), one major diﬀerence emerges. Middle-class middle-aged households, speciﬁcally in the
46-55 age bracket, are net nominal lenders in Canada while they are net nominal borrowers in the
United States. These households are important in aﬀecting aggregate outcomes through their labour
supply decisions since they account for the largest fraction (i.e., 70%) of the population in that age
cohort. Since a price-level shock aﬀects the labour supply through wealth eﬀects and the labour
supply is the main channel through which aggregate output is aﬀected in our analysis, this diﬀerence
can potentially lead to signiﬁcant aggregate and welfare diﬀerences between Canada and the United
States.
3.2.2 The government and foreign sector
For the positions of the government and foreign sectors, national balance sheet account (NBSA) data
from Statistics Canada are used. All the numbers are for the year 2005. Table 2 shows the results
for these two sectors as well as the aggregated household sector positions as percentage of GDP. As
expected, the government sector is a net negative holder of nominal instruments (-42.99% of GDP).
It holds large bond debts (-29.67%) as well as short-term debts (-7.60%) and a small mortgage asset
(3.19%). The government is also a net borrower in the pension category (-8.91%).
The foreign sector in Canada has a small positive net nominal position (2.85%) in nominal
instruments in 2005. It is composed of pension debts (-8.79%), bond assets (7.53%), short-term
debts (-4.65%) and mortgage assets (8.75%). Given the small size of its position, the size of the
redistribution with respect to this sector is also expected to be small. The nominal positions of
the government and foreign sectors are balanced by those of the household sector so that nominal
positions throughout the economy sum to zero.
3.3 Redistribution impact of an unexpected price increase
Based on the net nominal positions of agents in Section 3.2, we measure the extent of the direct
redistribution among these agents for a one-time unexpected price increase of 1% under two monetary
policy regimes, IT and PT with a six-year horizon to correct the price level. As discussed in this
section, under the PT regime, the term to maturity of a nominal instrument is an important factor
in determining the change in its real value following a price-level shock, while the maturity diﬀerence
14Note that households could conceivably hold a positive net nominal position in mortgages. This is because their
indirect mortgage position through shares held in ﬁnancial institutions could be positive.
11does not aﬀect the real value under IT.
The maturity structure of these instruments are assumed as follows. For the nominal short-term
instruments, we set the time to maturity to be one year. For the nominal long-term instruments,
bonds, mortgages and pensions, we determine the maturity structure by directly applying the dis-
tributions of time to maturity in 2005. Given the maturity structures for these instruments, we
calculate the direct impact of a one-time 1% price-level increase on the agents’ net worth under the
two monetary policy regimes.
Table 3 shows the extent of the direct impact from the unexpected 1% price-level increase on
diﬀerent age and class household groups under two monetary policy regimes. It is generally the
case that the sign of the direct redistribution is the opposite of that of the net nominal position,
which is deﬁned to be the sum of the nominal short-term and the nominal long-term positions as in
Table 1. As the exposition in Section 2 shows, the magnitude of the redistribution is smaller under
PT than IT. Under IT, the redistribution ranges from a gain of 0.89% of net worth for the youngest
middle-class to a loss of -0.34% of net worth for the oldest middle-class. Under PT with the six-year
horizon, the numbers for the same groups are 0.19% and -0.19%, respectively. Under both regimes,
young middle class and young poor households receive positive redistributions, whereas old or rich
households receive negative redistributions. These are direct results of the young middle class and
young poor households having a negative nominal position in nominal instruments. The table also
shows the results under PT with the ﬁfteen-year horizon. As observed, the numbers are between
those under IT and those under PT with the six-year horizon. This result is expected as the price-
level path after the shock under PT with the ﬁfteen-year horizon falls between those under IT and
under PT with the six-year horizon.
Table 4 shows the redistributions between sectors. Government receives a positive redistribution
from the reduction of its nominal debts by 0.43% of GDP under IT while the foreign sector receives
a negative redistribution of -0.03%. Under PT with the six-year horizon, the numbers are again
smaller with redistributions of 0.14% and 0.01% for government and foreigners, respectively. The
positive redistributions to these two sectors are from the household sector, which loses wealth in
these scenarios. Under PT with the ﬁfteen-year horizon, all the numbers are between those under IT
and under PT with the six-year horizon. Speciﬁcally, the net loss in the household sector is 0.19%
of GDP, about a half of that under IT. There are two reasons why a gap exists between IT and
PT despite a long horizon of ﬁfteen years in PT. First, there are nominal instruments which have
longer-than ﬁfteen-year term to maturity such as pensions and long-term bonds. As a result, those
instruments are not aﬀected by a price-level shock under PT. Second, shorter-term instruments (i.e.,
terms to maturity of less than ﬁfteen years) are still aﬀected since there is still a gap between the
pre-shock expected price level and the post-shock realized price level.
Discussion The extent of the redistribution is higher under IT than PT. This is due to the fact
that long-term positions are less sensitive to price-level shocks under PT, given that the central bank
credibly brings the price-level back to its original path. Quantitative diﬀerences between IT and PT
are also large. For example, the total household sector loss from the 1% positive price-level shock is
12almost three times as large under IT relative to PT with the six-year horizon. The result speaks to
the potential importance of taking into account the portfolio of assets and liabilities with diﬀerent
term-to-maturities into the monetary policy analysis. Given that older households are more heavily
invested in bonds and pensions, this importance should increase in the near future with expected
demographic changes as old households are expected to account for a larger share of the population.
We will address this issue in Section 7.
4 Model
Given the redistributions that we calculated in the previous sections, we now turn to the aggre-
gate and welfare eﬀects of those redistributions. We consider a small open economy populated by
overlapping generations with a positive world rate of return, r.
Demography and preferences Agents can live up to I periods and can be one of j ∈ {1,··· ,J}
skill types with an endowment of eﬃcient units of labour, eij. The measure of each type ij is given by
Ω(i,j) where
P
i,j [Ω(i,j)] = 1. Agents retire at the mandatory age i∗. Each agent faces a probability
si of surviving from age i to age i + 1. For simplicity, we assume that before retirement age agents
do not die (i.e., si = 1 for i < i∗). In period t, each individual of age i and type j maximizes his










where E is the expectations operator. Expectations are taken over age-speciﬁc mortality shocks and
stochastic price level shocks z. In equation (11), uj is the temporal utility function of type j agents,
ci,j,t and ni,j,t are respectively consumption and labour supply of age i and type j agents at time
t, βj is the discount factor of type j agents. Agents have a bequest motive and it is modeled as a
“warm glow” preference for transfer to the next generation: Ψj(a) where only agents of age I give
intended bequests to their children.15 The warm glow preference implies that agents derive utility
from giving bequests to their children. Bequests left by age I agents of type j at time t is equally
allocated to age 1 agents (i.e., newborns) of the same type j at time t + 1. The preference for a
bequest is also type-speciﬁc so that we can capture the observed heterogeneity in bequest by type.
We assume that each household chooses savings, labour, and bequests optimally. We assume,




ij to be these exogenous shares of assets as follows.
• αs
ij : the share of assets held in short-term nominal form for age i and type j households with
a nominal interest rate equal to zero,
15The bequest is modeled to analyze the importance of the intergenerational eﬀects of an inﬂation shock.
13• α`
ij : the share held in long-term nominal form for age i and type j households with a nominal
rate of return equal to (1 + π)(1 + r) where π is the targeted inﬂation rate,
• αr
ij : the share held in real assets for age i and type j households with a real rate of return
equal to (1 + r).




where Nt and Kt are respectively aggregate labour and capital inputs at time t. Given prices, ﬁrms
maximize proﬁts and as a result we have the following:











where δ is the depreciation rate of capital and w is the wage rate. Given that the world interest rate
r is constant the capital labour ratio is constant.
Stochastic shock and the central bank The stochastic nature of the model is given by iid aggregate
proportional shocks z to the price level targeted by the central bank. In this context, under IT, the
central bank sets its actions such that
P0
P
= (1 + π)(1 + z0) or E{P0} = P (1 + π),
where z0 and P0 are respectively the next period shock and price level. Under PT, the central bank
sets
P0 = (1 + π)t(1 + z0) or E{P0} = (1 + π)t.
Problem of households It is convenient to recursively represent the problem of a household under
two diﬀerent regimes: π = IT and π = PT. Let vi,j,t(a) be the beginning of period value function
where a is the current wealth holdings of age i and type j household at time t. The dynamic program
of the household can be described as follows.
vijt(a) = max
c,n,y


















14where the respective real returns on short-term and long-term nominal assets under diﬀerent mone-
tary policy regimes Rs,π(z0) and Rl,π(z0) depend on z0 and are given by
Rs,PT(z0) = Rs,IT(z0) = 1
(1+¯ π)(1+z0) ,
R`,PT(z0) = 1 + ¯ r and R`,IT(z0) = 1+¯ r
1+z0.
Equation (15) is the budget constraint of the household. The left hand side of equation (15)
is consumption c and savings y for next period. The right hand side of the budget constraint
consists of resources at hand a, after-tax labour income with a current labour income tax rate τt,
and government period t transfer Ti,t which is age dependent. The transfer consists of two parts and
is given by Tit = Td
t +Tr
it. The ﬁrst part Td
t is the accidental bequest which is distributed equally as
a lump sum transfer to all households.16 The second part Tr
i,t is the government retirement income
transfer to the retired households in the form of social security or the government’s retirement income
transfer program. Equation (16) gives the law of motion of next period assets a0(z0) where z0 is the
next period inﬂation shock. The indicator function 1(i = I) is one when households reach the last
age and thus can give bequest a0(z0) to their children. It is assumed that households can not die
with negative assets or negative bequests.
Government The government ﬁnances government consumption (Gt), transfer to retirees, and in-
terest payments on government debt Bt by raising revenue from taxing labour income and issuing
government debt. We deﬁne two types of government budget constraints, the period-by-period bud-
get constraint and the present value budget constraint. The period-by-period budget constraint of
the government is described as follows.











Ω(i,j)τt weij ni,j,t + Bt+1 (17)


































Ω(i,j)τt weij ni,j,t, (18)
where the left-hand-side shows the present value of all current and future expenditures and the
right-hand-side the tax revenues. Both types of the budget equation are used in the simulations.
16The accidental bequest is the reallocation of those assets left behind by households who died before reaching age
I.
15The transfer to retirees depends on the age of households. The government also collects all
accidental bequests and distributes them equally to all households in a lump sum fashion.
X
i>1,j
Ω(i − 1,j)(1 − si−1)ai,j,t = Td
t . (19)
The behaviour of the government is taken as exogenous and is calibrated to the steady state of the ac-
tual economy. We will consider various ﬁscal policy reactions after an inﬂation-induced redistribution
shock.
Foreigners The behaviour of the foreign sector is taken as exogenous. The foreign sector period t
asset or debt in the domestic asset market is given by aF
t .
4.1 Equilibrium
Deﬁnition 1. An equilibrium for a given regime π ∈ {IT,PT} is a world interest rate r, a sequence
of wage rates {wt}, a sequence of individual decisions {ci,j,t,ni,j,t,ai,j,t}, ﬁrm decisions {Kt,Nt},
government decisions {Gt,τt,Bt,Tt}, foreigners’ debt {aF
t } such that:
1. Given r and government policies, each household solves the household problem (14)-(16).
2. Given prices, ﬁrms maximize proﬁts.
3. The equal lump sum transfer constraint (19) of accidental bequest holds every period.
4. The government budget constraint (17) or (18) is satisﬁed.







6. The good market clears in every period:
X
i,j
Ω(i,j)ci,j,t + It + Gt + NXt = Yt, (21)
where NXt = (1 + r)aF
t − aF
t+1is net export, It = Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt is aggregate investment.
164.2 Shocks
To have shocks to the environment that directly translate into unexpected price changes, consider a





where Y is output, v is velocity and M is money, or more precisely, short term nominal assets. A
shock to the price level z can be thought of literally as a permanent shock to velocity. Money creation
then implements either IT and PT. This is the simplest, but not only, possible theory of the shock
consistent with this model.
5 Calibration
5.1 Model parameters
We calibrate the parameters of the model to the steady state of our model economy by matching the
selected moments from the model to counter-parts from the data. We use the six age cohorts, i, and
the three economic classes, j, of as deﬁned previously in Section 3.2.1. Our basic calibration strategy
for choosing the household parameters is to jointly match the distributions of eﬀective wage rates
and asset holdings across household groups. For production technology and government parameters,
we calibrate them to match their relevant moments. Table 5 summarizes the calibrated parameter
values for preferences, demography, technology and the government as discussed in this section.




t (1 − nt)ηj(1−σ)
1 − σ
(22)







The parameters to be determined consist of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ, the
economic class speciﬁc weight on leisure, ηj, the class speciﬁc bequest parameters, ξj and j, and
the class speciﬁc time discount factor, βj. We set σ to 2, a standard value. The value of ηj is
set to achieve the average work hour fractions of 0.331, 0.409 and 0.427 for the poor, the middle-
17class and the rich, respectively.17 ξj is the weight the household puts on leaving bequests to the
next generation. The 2005 SFS data set contains the bequest information. According to the data
set, the average amounts of life-time bequests received are $146,103, $26,766 and $11,584 for our
classiﬁcations of rich, middle class and poor, respectively. Since the values for middle class and poor
are relatively small, we set ξj = 0 for these groups. In determining ξ3, we target the ratio of the
average bequest over the average net worth of the rich. This ratio is 0.088 from the 2005 SFS. The
values of j are set so that j = 1 − (1 − ηj)(1 − σ).
The discount factor, βj, directly inﬂuences household asset accumulations. We set the economic
class speciﬁc value of βj to match the relative net worth of three classes and the ratio of output to
household assets. Speciﬁcally, we pin down the three values of βj to match the following ratios: (1)
the average net worth of rich households to that of the middle class, (2) the average net worth of the
middle class to the poor, and (3) the average net worth of the middle-class to GDP per household.
These ratios are 6.5, 3.8 and 2.4, respectively. The net worth numbers are from the 2005 SFS. In
2005, the GDP per household was $112,159. The annualized values of βj obtained are 0.99, 1.01 and
1.10 for the poor, middle class and rich, respectively. In order to match the between-group ratios of
the net worth, the βj for the rich had to be much higher than the other two classes.
Portfolio For each household group deﬁned by i and j, there are three parameters for the exogenous
share of short-term, long-term and real assets, αs
ij, α`
ij and αr
ij, respectively. In order to map
the portfolio ﬁndings from the data to the model, we assume that the long-term assets in the
model represent the categories bond, mortgage and pensions all together. With this assumption,




ij, they are directly taken from Table 1.
Demography Households face a conditional probability of survival, si. The main margin that we
want to capture is the relative size of the young and the old. We assume that the households do not
die before retirement and start facing a positive probability of death when they retire. In 2005, the
ratio of those who were 65 or older to those who were 20 or older was 17% in Canada.19 We adjust
the probability of death of retirees, s4 and s5 to achieve this ratio. We assume that half of the model
population of cohort 66-75 survives to the next age category, ≥76. The parameter values obtained
as a result are s4 = 0.547 and s5 = 0.500. Since all the ≥76 households will die in the following
period, s6 = 0.
Labour Productivity The age-class speciﬁc labour endowments, eij, are directly estimated using
panel data from Statistics Canada. The Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) contains
information on Canadian households and persons regarding labour supply and income over time. We
have used the 1999-2004 wave. We estimate the age-class speciﬁc hourly wage rate by the following
17These fractions are from Dorolet and Morissette (1997) who document average work hours by income based on the
1995 Survey of Work Arrangements from Statistics Canada.
18The average term to maturity of all long-term categories in the data is about 11 years.
19The number is from Statistics Canada at “http://www40.statcan.ca/”.
18ﬁxed-eﬀects regression.
ln(wage rate)ht = θ1(age)ht + θ2(age2)ht + θ3(work experience)ht
+ θ4(years of school)ht + νh + εht,
where the index h speciﬁes the person and t the time. The wage rate is deﬁned by the total wage
and salary income divided by the total hours worked. We use this variable to approximate the
labour endowments. The work experience is the number of years worked. The years of school are
the number of school years completed. The regression results are presented in Table 6. In order to
derive the results for our economic classes, we approximate them using the years of schooling. For
each appropriate age group, we sort them into the poor, middle class and rich by the school years so
that the size of the sample for each class is as deﬁned previously, 20%, 70% and 10%, respectively
for the poor, middle class and rich. With this deﬁnition of the groups and the parameters from
the regression estimation, we apply the average age, the average school years and the average work
experience to derive the average wage rate for each age-class group. Table 7 shows the resulting
relative endowment of each household group.
Technology The production technology in our model economy is standard and assumed to be Cobb-
Douglas. The capital share parameter α is set to 0.33. The annual depreciation rate is assumed to be
0.07 and appropriately adjusted for the model period of 10 years by setting δ = 1.0−(1.0−0.07)10.
Government Debts and Transfers There are four parameters that concern the government, the
labour tax rate (τ), the retirement income transfer, government spending and government debts. The
tax rate is set to match the ratio of tax revenue to output of 32% as in the Canadian data in 2005.
We obtained τ = 0.301. The average retirement income transfer was 13% of GDP per household in
2005. Hence, government transfer by age, Tr
i , with i ≥ i∗ is calibrated to achieve this ratio, where
i∗ is the retirement age. Government debts, B, are calibrated to match the government nominal
debts to the GDP ratio of 42.99% in 2005. Finally, since there is no guarantee that the government
budget constraint holds under our calibration strategy, we chose to set the value of G to balance the
government budget. The resulting government spending to GDP ratio is 16%. The number in the
data is 35% in 2005. This gap in the government spending to GDP ratio exists because the only
roles of the government (in the steady state) are to tax workers and to transfer the tax revenue to
retirees. The model does not take into account all other government activities.
Foreigners The foreigners’ asset position, aF, is set to match their assets to GDP ratio of 2.85% in
2005. Even though the foreign sector in our economy does not interact directly with other sectors
due to the assumption of the small open economy, it is important to capture the asset position of
this sector to entirely account for the redistribution. The redistribution through the foreign sector is
a leak from the economy. We will conduct a sensitivity analysis to check how important this leak is
by closing down this leak with the assumption that the household sector absorbs the foreign sector’s
nominal position. The analysis will show the diﬀerence in the aggregate response to the price-level
shock.
19Feeding the Direct Redistributional Impacts into the Model as Wealth Shocks In order to
analyze the aggregate eﬀects on output and welfare from the initial price-level shock, we model the
price-level shock directly as the shock to wealth. We feed the household direct impact numbers in
Table 3 and those of the government and the foreign sectors in Table 4 into the model presented
above for both IT and PT. We set the PT policy horizon to a baseline of six years. The assets of the
households in the steady-state equilibrium are redistributed as a shock according to the results in
Table 3 for each age-class group. Speciﬁcally, the positive or the negative redistributions of the age
group ≤35 are applied to their beginning-of-period asset position before they make decisions for the
period. All other age groups’ beginning-of-period assets are shocked similarly. Also, the steady-state
position of the government and foreign sectors are redistributed according to the numbers in Table 4.
Given these one-time shocks, we solve the model for its transition path by assuming that agents’
decisions are approximated linearly at the zero price-level shock from the second period on.
6 Findings
The mechanism by which aggregate eﬀects on output and welfare can result from zero-sum redistri-
butions has to do with the asymmetric responses in labour supply through wealth eﬀects of diﬀerent
agents. With the assumption of preferences, households who gain (lose) wealth from the price-level
shock reduce (increase) their labour supply. If redistributions are zero-sum and labour supply re-
sponses to wealth changes are linear for all agents, the aggregate labour supply change would be
zero. However, because of asymmetric labour supply responses by diﬀerent households, these eﬀects
do not cancel out even with zero-sum redistributions.
There are two dimensions where asymmetry exists among households. First, between workers
and retirees, while workers can respond to the change in wealth level by adjusting their labour supply,
retirees cannot. Second, among workers, there are two types of worker heterogeneities leading to
asymmetric labour supply responses. The preference weight on leisure, ηj, is economic-class speciﬁc
and labour productivity, eij, is age and class speciﬁc. These heterogeneities lead to asymmetric
labour responses even among workers. Finally, these asymmetric responses between workers and
retirees as well as among workers are ampliﬁed by the fact that each household group is hit by a
diﬀerent magnitude of wealth change based on their portfolio. Hence, the aggregate output eﬀect
is caused by the aggregate labour supply change due to these asymmetric responses by diﬀerent
households.
We present the results for the transition dynamics and the welfare from the initial direct impact
of the price-level shock described in Section 3.3. We simulate the transition back to the steady state
under several diﬀerent assumptions about the government’s ﬁscal policy regarding the windfall gains
it receives and the foreign sector’s redistribution.20 In doing so, we make an assumption about how
government debts change over the transition period. With the positive price-level shock, the real
value of government debts is reduced creating a windfall gain. We assume that the level of debts
20The government budget balance is assumed throughout the analysis according to one of the constraints, (17) or
(18).
20goes back to the steady state after one period or 10 years.
In Section 6.1, we show the results of the baseline case where the government transfers its wind-
fall gain to households by lowing the labour income tax rates. Next, in Section 6.2, we show the
results of simulations where the government’s ﬁscal policy regarding the windfall gain changes. The
welfare analysis of the households who are alive at the time of the shock is conducted in Section 6.3.
Section 6.4 conducts sensitivity analyses.
6.1 The response to the redistributional eﬀects across households
We assume in the baseline simulation that the government’s ﬁscal policy lowers the labour income
tax to transfer its windfall gain to households. The tax rate is lowered for the ﬁrst 50-year period
where the rate goes back to the steady state level in a linear fashion at the end of the period while
maintaining the present value government budget balance. In Section 6.2, we vary the assumptions
on ﬁscal policy as well as on the government budget constraint.
Households First, under IT, Figures 1 and 2 show the percentage deviations from the steady state
in life cycle asset and labour, respectively, for agents who are alive at the time of the shock. In
the ﬁgures, the age in the title is that of the time of the shock. The values are normalized by the
economic class average. The cohort 56-65 has, for example, zero values for the ﬁrst 3 periods (i.e.,
≤35, 36-45 and 46-55) as the shock arrives at the fourth period of its life. From the asset ﬁgures,
under IT, the middle-class tends to lose the most, especially the three cohorts aged 56 and above
which decrease their assets by up to 0.5% of the class average.
Figures 3 and 4 show the results under PT. All rich cohorts aged 46 and above show declines
in assets over the life cycle but the magnitudes are much smaller than under IT. The poor cohort
that loses the most is aged 56-65 with a decline of 0.25%. Middle-class and rich households show a
similar pattern in that changes are smaller under PT. Under both IT and PT, we also observe that
the intended bequest left by the rich decreases for all cohorts aged 46 and above. This will create a
persistent eﬀect through the following generations’ initial asset level.
As discussed in the beginning of this section, the aggregate eﬀects do not cancel out due to
several dimensions of heterogeneity. The households diﬀer in terms of portfolio, age- and type-
speciﬁc productivity (both among workers and between workers and retirees) and propensities to
work and save. With the speciﬁed household preferences, wealth eﬀects dictate that whoever gains
(loses) in assets will reduce (increase) labour supply over the life cycle on average. In the baseline
case, these wealth eﬀects are coupled with substitution eﬀects of the labour income tax change.
Figures 2 and 4 show the net eﬀect of the two under IT and PT, respectively. For example in,
Figures 2, the middle-class ≤35 cohort gains assets and, the wealth eﬀect should dictate that the
labour supply decreases. However, the substitution eﬀect from the reduction in the labour income tax
overpowers, and we observe a net increase in the labour supply. Qualitatively similar patterns can
21be observed under both IT and PT graphs, however, quantitatively they are diﬀerent. For example,
the rich 46-55 cohort increases labour supply by 0.25% under IT while the number is about 0.06%
under PT.
One qualitative diﬀerence that displays the importance of maturity structure is observed for the
cohort aged 56-65. Under IT, the initial decrease in assets for the poor is smaller than that of the
middle-class. However, under PT, the decrease is much larger than that of the middle-class. This is
consistent with the numbers in Table 3 and is a result of the middle-class 56-65 age cohort having
a larger position in long-term assets as shown in Table 1 as opposed to the poor having a larger
position in short assets. Under PT, the values of long-term nominal instruments are less aﬀected by
a price-level shock, while under IT the values of all nominal instruments are equally aﬀected.
Aggregates Aggregate eﬀects are generated due to household heterogeneities together with the
ﬁscal policy to transfer the government’s windfall gain. The aggregate responses over time in output
and household sector assets under IT and PT are shown in Figure 5 for the baseline ﬁscal policy of
labour income tax cuts. The ﬁgures show percentage deviations from the steady state. At t = 0,
we observe the magnitude of the contemporaneous responses of output to the direct redistribution.
The ﬁrst result to note is that the initial impact on output is positive at t = 0 both under IT
and PT. This is not an obvious result. As seen in Figures 2 and 4, some households increase their
labour supply while others decrease at the time of the impact. Speciﬁcally the decreases in work
hours by the young poor and middle-class are more than oﬀset by the increases in hours from the
middle-aged middle-class and all the rich workers. Hence, the net eﬀects on output are positive. In
terms of aggregate assets, the initial direct impact is -0.158% from the steady state value under IT
and -0.057% under PT. The increase in the output is caused by the wealth eﬀects among workers.
In aggregate, the increase in labour supply of workers who lost wealth overpowers the decrease of
those who gain wealth so that the aggregate labour supply increases as a result.
With the 1% price-level shock, output under IT initially increases by 0.104% above the steady
state level compared to 0.031% under PT. Thus, the output response under IT is 3.3 times higher
than under PT. This is caused by smaller redistributions under PT leading to smaller changes in
household behaviors. In terms of aggregate assets, the initial direct impact is -0.158% from the steady
state value under IT and -0.057% under PT. Correlating with these initial impacts, the transition
back to the steady state seems to take a longer time under IT than under PT, which is especially
apparent in the asset ﬁgure. As time passes, aggregate labour supply continues to decrease as the
tax rate returns to its initial value before the shock. This decrease in labour supply continues until
the tax rate goes back to the steady state level at which point labour supply is below that of the
steady state. This is due to the potential for intertemporal substitution associated with the labour
supply decision. That is, workers work longer hours before the tax rate increases back to its steady
state level and reduce their work hours thereafter.
As previously mentioned in Section 3.2.1, there is a diﬀerence between Canada and the United
States: the middle-class, middle-aged households are net lenders in Canada but net borrowers in
the United States. Thus, with a positive price-level shock, these groups will lose their wealth and
22increase their labour supplies in Canada, whereas, in the United States they decrease their labour
supplies. This margin turns out to be the decisive force in the positive initial aggregate output
reaction in Canada compared to the negative one in the United States as shown in Doepke and
Schneider (2006b).
6.2 Redistributional eﬀects with other ﬁscal policies
In this section, we discuss the results from other ﬁscal policies regarding windfall gains and the budget
constraint. In Section 6.2.1, the tax rate is adjusted as in the baseline case but the government
budget balance is met every period. We conduct two other simulations where the government no
longer cuts taxes to transfer its windfall gain to households but instead pursues other ﬁscal policies.
In Section 6.2.2, the government distributes the windfall gain in a lump sum fashion to all households
while maintaining the government budget balance period by period. Finally in Section 6.2.3, the
government gives the lump-sum transfers only to retired households, again holding the government
budget balance every period.
6.2.1 Labour tax changes that balance the budget period by period
We show what can happen if the government pursues a balanced budget period by period under
the tax rate adjustment policy. Figure 6 shows the results. As can be seen, the volatility of output
and assets are higher. The contemporary reactions of output are 0.21% and 0.035% for IT and PT,
respectively. The high volatility is due to the fact that, under the small economy assumption with a
ﬁxed interest rate, the volatility of output depends primarily on the volatility of labour supply. The
tax rate has a direct eﬀect on labour supply. Thus, the government, in trying to balance the budget
period-by-period by adjusting the tax rate, creates the extra volatility that we observe in Figure 6
as compared to the case in Figure 5. If we compare the relative initial response of output under IT
and PT, the output response under IT is six times larger than under PT. These results suggest that
ﬁscal policy regarding the government’s windfall gains is an important determinant of the price-level
shock’s eﬀects on the aggregate economy. Relative diﬀerences between PT and IT also depend on
the ﬁscal policy choice. The behaviour of ﬁscal policy does not lead to large ﬂuctuations under PT
because the size of the direct redistribution impact is small, and hence there are smaller windfall
gains for the government to transfer back to households.
6.2.2 Lump sum transfer
With lump-sum transfer, the initial impact on output is much smaller. As shown in Figure 7, the
initial output eﬀects are small: 0.003% above the steady state under IT and 0.0005% under PT.
Both series almost converge back to the steady state after 40 years. Comparing the initial responses
of output under IT and PT, the output response under IT is six times higher than under PT. This
is caused by smaller redistributions under PT, leading to smaller changes in household behaviours.
23Smaller overall responses in output are caused by smaller labour supply responses.
6.2.3 Transfer to retirees
The ﬁscal policy of a lump-sum transfer to retirees contrasts with the baseline case in that the
recipients of the government’s windfall gain are retirees instead of workers. Figure 8 shows the
results from the case where the government gives lump-sum transfers only to retired households in
the form of increased retirement transfer income. The reactions of output are positive and 0.049%
above the steady state level under IT and 0.014% under PT. Since workers do not directly beneﬁt
under this ﬁscal policy, the increase in aggregate labour supply is smaller here than in the baseline
case. The output response under IT is about 3.5 times that under PT.
6.3 Welfare analysis
In this section, we study the welfare of households who are alive at the time of the shock. The direct
redistributional impacts in Table 3 give us an idea about the welfare of these households. However,
the ultimate measure of welfare depends also on the government’s ﬁscal policy in redistributing its
windfall gains and households’ reactions to these redistributions. To observe the ultimate impact of
the price-level shock under the two monetary policy regimes, Tables 8 and 9 show for each group of
households alive at the time of the shock a welfare measure under IT and PT, respectively. Each
table contains welfare measures for the three ﬁscal policies discussed above, excluding the case with
labour taxes adjusted to balance the budget period by period. To be more precise, the numbers in
the table are percentage changes in consumption (i.e., equivalent variations) that make the pre-shock
steady state household just as well oﬀ over the transition period as for each combination of monetary
and ﬁscal policy regimes.
For example, in Table 8, under IT with the tax cuts policy, “0.101” for middle-class ≤35 house-
holds indicates a welfare improvement over the pre-shock steady state of 0.101% of steady state
consumption. Negative numbers indicate welfare losses. The weighted average of the welfare mea-
sure for all household groups is provided in the table. In calculating these numbers, we hold constant
the other dimensions of decisions – that is, the labour supply and savings decisions – at the steady
state values. Hence, this welfare measure includes eﬀects arising through the labour supply and the
savings margins, all expressed in consumption terms.
Under both IT and PT, the tables show that, in the baseline simulation with tax cuts, the group
that loses the most is middle-class households older than 75. The loss is higher under IT, at -1.099%,
than under PT, at -0.609%. On the other hand, the two youngest groups in the middle class show
welfare gains both under IT and PT. Comparing the two tables, the welfare losses and gains of each
group of households are much smaller under PT than under IT. There are average welfare losses
across all households of -0.055% and -0.034% under IT and PT, respectively. Thus, despite the
positive output eﬀects, there are welfare losses both under IT and PT with the tax cuts policy. The
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and retired households are worse oﬀ due to the reduction in the value of assets. On the other hand,
workers are mostly better oﬀ with lower tax rates. This second eﬀect is non-linear since the labour
supply decision is non-linear with respect to tax rates. The ﬁrst eﬀect prevails over the second eﬀect
and hence the average welfare loss under both monetary policy regimes.
With the lump sum transfer policy, there is no longer any substitution eﬀect among worker
households as the eﬀective wage rate is unchanged in the absence of the tax cuts. Instead, the only
eﬀects will be the wealth eﬀects from the initial redistribution and the lump-sum transfer. The
combined wealth eﬀects under the lump sum transfer policy lead to smaller welfare eﬀects among
workers than in the baseline case. For example, the middle-class ≤35 cohort now gains only 0.78%
under IT relative to the baseline case of 0.101%. On the other hand, welfare losses of older households
decrease and even turn positive for the poor. In particular, the loss of the poor ≥76 cohort changed
from -0.286% in the baseline case to 0.223% in the lump sum transfer policy. This is because the
relative change in household wealth from the lump sum transfer is higher for the poor, whose initial
wealth is lowest. The average welfare loss under IT is -0.015%. Under PT, relative to IT, the lump
sum transfer ﬁscal policy leads to welfare eﬀects that are smaller in absolute values. This is due to
the fact that initial direct gains and losses from a price-level shock are smaller and also on account
of the smaller role that ﬁscal policy plays under PT. The average welfare loss under PT is -0.009%.
With respect to the increase in the retirement income transfer, more retired household groups
gain compared to all retirees having a negative sign under the tax cuts ﬁscal policy in both IT and
PT. Despite the wealth loss from the initial price-level shock, the poor and middle-class retirees
have positive welfare eﬀects due to the retirement income transfer. The average welfare measures
under this ﬁscal policy are positive compared to the other two ﬁscal policies, with 0.195% and
0.094% for IT and PT, respectively. Since the major losers from a positive price-level shock are the
retired households, who are not able to adjust their labour supplies, this welfare result suggests that
compensating these groups can improve average welfare better than other ﬁscal policies for positive
price-level shocks.
The interaction of monetary and ﬁscal policy can have important welfare eﬀects. Under IT,
diﬀerent ﬁscal policies can lead to a wide range of welfare gains and losses. For example, the
middle-class ≥76 cohort displays a welfare loss of -1.099% of consumption under the tax cuts policy
as opposed to a gain of 2.130% of consumption under the retirement income transfer policy. In
comparison, under PT, these numbers are -0.609% and 0.542%, respectively. Thus, under IT, diﬀerent
ﬁscal policies lead to wider variation in welfare losses and gains than under PT. Or in other words,
under PT, households are better shielded against the actions taken by the government. This is
because, under IT, the government’s windfall gain from a price-level shock is larger than under PT.
Hence there is less room for the diﬀerent ﬁscal policies to distort the economy under PT. The smaller
gains accruing to government under PT are due to the fact that the government’s long-term debts
are less sensitive to price-level increases.
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is very important in determining the aggregate and welfare eﬀects of price-level shocks. A tax cut
further enhances gains among the young while a transfer in the form of retirement income beneﬁts
compensates the old for their losses. The transfer to the old is mostly ﬁnanced by the rich. With each
ﬁscal policy, the aggregate output eﬀects are higher under IT than PT, and the largest eﬀects come
from the tax cut policy. This is because the ﬁscal policy scenario matters less under PT than IT.
For example, under IT, when a tax cut policy is adopted so as to balance the government’s budget
every period, output increases substantially and becomes highly volatile. However, under PT, output
increases only slightly and is not volatile. The intuition behind this result comes from the fact that
under PT, the windfall gains of the government are relatively small and therefore the policy used
by the government will not aﬀect the incentives facing private agents in labour and capital markets
as dramatically. We interpret our ﬁndings as a strong reminder that the eﬀects of monetary policy
depend on ﬁscal policy.
Moreover, the welfare eﬀects depends on ﬁscal policies. For example, weighted average welfare
is similar between IT and PT with the tax cut policy but higher under IT than PT with the ﬁscal
policy that gives a higher transfer to retirees. This is because diﬀerent ﬁscal policies compensate
diﬀerent groups of households. With a higher transfer to retirees, windfall gains by the government
overly compensate the poor and the middle-class retirees who lose from the price-level shock to raise
average welfare. This eﬀect is larger under IT due to larger windfall gains.
6.4 Sensitivity analysis
Several sensitivity analyses are conducted. Speciﬁcally, in Section 6.4.1, we observe the eﬀects of
changing the horizon of the PT policy, and in Section 6.4.2, we study the results from a wider range
of the price-level shocks. In Section 6.4.3, we analyze a case where the foreign sector’s nominal
position is reallocated to the household sector. Finally, in Section 6.4.4, we address the sensitivity
of the ﬁxed-portfolio assumption by conducting price-shock experiments for a hypothetical portfolio
of agents.
6.4.1 Diﬀerent price-level target horizons
Figure 9 shows the output and asset responses during transition for IT, PT with a 15-year horizon
and PT with a 6-year horizon, all with the tax cuts ﬁscal policy. It is expected that, as the horizon
under PT becomes longer, the magnitude of the redistribution converges to that under IT. As a
result, we would expect the reactions in output and assets under PT also to converge to those under
IT as the PT horizon increases. This is what the ﬁgures show. The line for PT with the 15-year
horizon stays in between IT and PT with the 6-year horizon. The initial responses in output are
0.104%, 0.049% and 0.031% for IT, PT with the 15-year horizon and PT with the 6-year horizon,
respectively. Table 10 summarizes the welfare eﬀects to each household group under each monetary
policy. As was the case for the direct redistributional impacts, the individual welfare numbers are
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horizon.
6.4.2 Diﬀerent shocks
We conduct a sensitivity analysis that considers shocks of varying sign and magnitude: 5%, 2%,
1%, −1%, −2% and −5%. For the baseline case with the baseline tax cuts ﬁscal policy, under IT,
the initial reactions in output, respectively, are 0.511%, 0.209%, 0.104%, −0.079%, −0.192% and
−0.547%. The respective numbers under PT are 0.163%, 0.064%, 0.031%, −0.017%, −0.039% and
−0.151%. Under both IT and PT, initial output reactions monotonically change with shocks. Given
the shock, the eﬀect is larger in absolute value under IT than PT. Asymmetric output responses (in
absolute values) between positive and negative shocks are observed due to non-linear and asymmetric
labour supply responses by diﬀerent households. Household preferences over labour supply are non-
linear with respect to the after-tax wage rate. In addition, as a result of this non-linearity, changes
in labour supply responses among diﬀerent household groups are also diﬀerent.
Table 11 presents the average welfare measures for IT and PT with diﬀerent ﬁscal policies. The
welfare numbers are in general monotonic with respect to the sign and the magnitude of the shock.
Also, it is observed that the magnitude of the average welfare eﬀect in absolute value for each price-
level shock is larger under IT than PT. When government adjusts the retirement income transfer to
distribute its windfall gains, we observe the change in the sign of the eﬀects. With positive shocks
under IT, the welfare eﬀects are positive and vice versa for negative shocks. This is in contrast to
the previous two ﬁscal policies. As explained in Section 6.3 for the 1% positive shock, this contrast
is because the transfer to retired households helps those demographics who lose the most from the
price-level shock.
6.4.3 Redistributional eﬀects, with the changed debt, and without the changed foreign net
asset position
All the direct redistributional impacts sum to zero. However, from the standpoint of the domestic
economy, the redistribution with respect to the foreign sector is a leak. In order to analyze the zero-
sum redistribution within the economy, we analyze a case where the foreign sector’s nominal position
is reallocated to the household sector. We adjust the household sector’s real assets to balance out this
shift. Hence with this assumption, there will not be any redistribution to the foreign sector from a
price-level shock. The additional redistribution to the household sector, as a result of this adjustment,
is allocated lump-sum to all households. Figure 10 shows the dynamics under the baseline simulation
and the case where the foreign sector has nominal position under IT with a 1% price-level shock. As
can be seen from the ﬁgures, there is not much diﬀerence between the two lines. This is due to the
fact that the foreign sector net nominal position is small in absolute value in 2005.21
21However, Meh and Terajima (2008) shows a negative trend for the foreign sector’s NNP. In 2007, the foreign sector
becomes a net borrower. Hence, the eﬀects with foreign sector could be larger in near future assuming the continuation
276.4.4 Portfolio Change
Throughout the paper, we have assumed that the portfolios of agents are ﬁxed. In this section, we
attempt to address this concern.
Following the successful implementation of a PT regime, one would expect risk-averse agents to
shift into long-term instruments. Given this tendency, we conduct an experiment with a hypothetical
portfolio, where all short-term instruments are swapped for bonds, one of the long-term instrument
categories.22 We do this for each household type and each sector of the economy. Note that these
hypothetical portfolios do not aﬀect any previous results under IT since the portfolio’s maturity
structure does not matter in measuring the extent of redistribution in this case. However, under
PT, since long-term instruments are less vulnerable to price-level shocks, the results change. More
speciﬁcally, under PT, with more long-term positions, a price-level shock causes less redistribution.
Figure 11 shows the output response comparisons for the baseline portfolio and the hypothetical
portfolio for diﬀerent ﬁscal policies under PT. As expected, the initial output responses are lower
relative to the baseline case under all three ﬁscal policies and even negative under the lump-sum
transfer policy. On welfare, Table 12 shows the welfare eﬀects under PT for the hypothetical portfo-
lios. Comparing these results against the baseline welfare eﬀects under PT in Table 9, most welfare
numbers became smaller in absolute value along with the average welfare measure, reﬂecting smaller
redistributions. This is a result of the smaller redistribution due to more long-term instruments
which are less sensitive to price-level shocks under PT. As mentioned, the results under IT are not
aﬀected by the portfolio changes.
7 Demographic change
In this section, we ask a hypothetical question: how would our results change if we faced a demo-
graphic structure like that expected to emerge 50 years from now? Since our model incorporates
over-lapping generations, it provides a framework to address questions regarding the eﬀects of changes
in the demographic structure. In Canada, the age structure of the population is expected to change
dramatically over the next 50 years. Based on population projections produced by Statistics Canada,
among those of ages 20 and above, the fraction of population above the age of 65 is projected to
double from 17.39% in 2006 to 33.30% in 2056.23 Speciﬁcally, we assume that the portfolios of house-
holds remain the same, and analyze the eﬀects on output and welfare if we double the size of the
household groups above age 65. In doing so, we maintain the calibrated parameters from the original
steady state and change only the underlying demographic structure by increasing the survival rate of
of this trend.
22We chose bonds over other long-term instruments like mortgages and pensions. We do this because the weighted
average time to maturity of bonds is longer at 9.9 years than that of mortgages at 5.1 years. In addition, bonds address
the potential transition to more long-term instruments better than pensions as pensions can be short-term instruments,
particularly for retirees.
23The 2056 number is based on a population projection by Statistics Canada at “http://www40.statcan.ca/”.
28the agents. With the initial calibration for 2005, the survival rate was calibrated so that the fraction
of the population 65 and above is 17%. With the demographic change, we set the survival rate to be
1 for all ages, which brings up the age 65 and above fraction of population to be 33%. We assume
the same direct impact on each household as in Table 3 for the 1% shock. Since these direct impacts
are derived from the current demographic structure, the redistributions are no longer zero sum. We
address this by adjusting the government debts to balance any changes in the redistributions to and
from households.
With this demographic change, it is expected that all households will accumulate more assets
in anticipation of longer retirement. In the context of the model at hand, this increase in asset
accumulation varies in degree between the three types of households. The rich households are more
patient and thus the rate of increase in assets is higher than the other two types. This implies
a higher dispersion of asset holdings among households following the demographic change. This
is worth noting since a positive price-level shock redistributes wealth from lenders (i.e., rich) to
borrowers (i.e., poor), which reduces the dispersion. In our average welfare measure, this shows up
as a positive eﬀect due to concavity in the utility function. In addition, as a result of larger asset
holdings, especially among the rich and the old, the total loss of the household sector becomes larger.
Since the loss of the household sector is balanced by the gain of the government sector, this gives
ﬁscal policy a larger role to play. The ﬁndings with demographic changes in output and welfare are
discussed below.
Output Figure 12 shows the output responses to the shock under three diﬀerent ﬁscal policies –
the tax cuts, the lump-sum transfer and the retirement income transfer. Under the tax cut policy,
the qualitative output responses are similar to the case with the baseline demographic structure.
However, quantitatively the eﬀects are diﬀerent. The initial output response has gone up and is
0.191% and 0.053% for IT and PT, respectively. These numbers are larger than those with the
current demographic structure, at 0.104% under IT and 0.031% under PT. This is a result of the
increase in the windfall gain to government, which is then passed on to households in the form of
lower tax rates. There are two sources of this increase in the windfall gain. First, as mentioned above,
given that households now expect to live longer, they increase their savings for retirement relative
to the baseline case without demographic changes. This increases the size of per-household wealth
losses, especially among retirees and the rich, who have a higher tendency to save. Second, since
there are more retirees, the aggregate wealth loss of retirees increases. These two sources contribute
to an increase in the government windfall gain which is then transferred back to households in the
form of lower tax rates. This implies that under the tax cut policy the tax rate will be lowered
further with demographic changes, leading the labour supply to increase more dramatically.
Under the lump-sum transfer policy, even the qualitative result in output turned out to be very
diﬀerent from those observed with the baseline demographic structure. The initial output response
is negative for both IT and PT. Output decreases by 0.067% under IT and by 0.042% under PT.
These compare to a 0.003% increase under IT and 0.0005% under PT with the current demographic
structure. Again, this is a result of the increase in the windfall gain to government. With the lump-
sum transfer policy, this causes the net gains among worker households to be larger following the
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and causing the aggregate labour supply to decrease. Hence, output declines and the decline is larger
under IT since the windfall gain is larger.
Finally, under the retirement transfer policy, the responses are positive but have gone down
to 0.029% and 0.005% for IT and PT, respectively, relative to those with the current demographic
structure, at 0.049% under IT and 0.014% under PT. With the retirement transfer policy, only retirees
beneﬁt from the ﬁscal policy. This result implies that the labour-supply responses of wealth-losing
workers outweigh those of wealth-gaining workers such that the aggregate labour supply increases.
However, the net wealth eﬀect among workers is small.
Welfare The eﬀects on welfare with demographic changes show several qualitative diﬀerences. Ta-
bles 13 and 14 display the welfare measure for each household group under IT and PT, respectively.
As we discussed previously, there is an increase in the accumulation of assets in general following the
demographic change. As a result, there are greater transfers from retirees to government, which are
then passed on to all households through ﬁscal policy. Under the tax cut ﬁscal policy with demo-
graphic changes, the tax cut is thus larger than in the case without the demographic change. Hence,
under IT, the tax cut raised the average welfare of workers more than enough to cancel out the neg-
ative welfare eﬀects on the rich and retirees. Even under PT, the average welfare loss became much
smaller. Compared to the welfare losses with the current demographic structure around -0.055%
and -0.034% under IT and PT, respectively, the resulting average welfare changes are 0.048% and
-0.003% for IT and PT, respectively, with demographic changes.
Under the lump-sum transfer ﬁscal policy, we observe for both IT and PT that the welfare num-
bers for all household groups are higher with demographic changes except for some groups among the
rich. This is a result of the following process. A larger government transfer with demographic changes
beneﬁts young workers with higher lump-sum transfers. In addition, given the higher propensity to
save among the rich, their assets increase more than proportionally with demographic changes, and
their losses from inﬂation grow accordingly. Since these losses are transferred lump sum back to
households, non-rich households reap the beneﬁt of larger losses by the rich. The net eﬀect is re-
ﬂected, for both IT and PT, in welfare numbers that are higher for all household groups except
for some rich households. Contrary to the current demographic structure where there are average
welfare losses of -0.015% and -0.009% for IT and PT, respectively, now there are gains in average
welfare of 0.076% and 0.011% for IT and PT, respectively.
Under the retirement transfer ﬁscal policy, the qualitative results are similar between the two
demographic structures. While there are 0.195% and 0.094% welfare gains with the current de-
mographic structure under IT and PT, respectively, the average welfare eﬀects with demographic
changes are 0.127% and 0.044% for IT and PT, respectively.
Table 15 shows the average welfare results for diﬀerent signs and magnitudes of shocks. As
discussed for the 1% shock case, we observe changes in sign for the welfare eﬀects with the labour
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the current demographic structure. Moreover, for these ﬁscal policies, a comparison with Table 11
shows that, with demographic changes, the diﬀerences in welfare eﬀects between IT and PT are much
larger than with the current demographic structure. For example, a positive 5% shock with the tax
cut policy leads to welfare eﬀects of -0.247% and -0.151% under IT and PT, respectively, with the
current demographic structure. On the other hand, the same shock leads to gains of 0.304% and
0.059% under IT and PT, respectively, with demographic changes. Hence, the diﬀerence (in absolute
value) for welfare eﬀects between IT and PT is larger with these demographic changes.
Discussion Two main points emerge in this section. First, with a positive shock for both IT and
PT, the average welfare eﬀects are higher for all ﬁscal policies considered and mostly turned positive
(except for the tax cut policy under PT) following demographic changes. This happens because with
demographic changes asset accumulation intensiﬁes in preparation for a longer retirement period.
This increase in assets occurs to varying degrees for poor, middle class and rich because of the
heterogeneity in their preferences, especially in β. Rich households with higher β increase assets
much more than other classes. As a result, wealth inequality among households increases. Inﬂation
mitigates inequality by redistributing wealth from lenders (i.e., rich) to borrowers (i.e., poor). Given
the curvature of the utility function, this improves average welfare in the economy. Under IT, this
eﬀect is stronger as the redistribution is larger than under PT. Hence the average welfare eﬀects are
more positive under IT than under PT with positive shocks.
Second, from our ﬁnding that the diﬀerence in welfare eﬀects between IT and PT is larger with
demographic changes, we arrive at an important implication. From the tax cut policy in Table 15,
we can observe over the range of shocks from -5% to 5% that welfare numbers change from -0.36% to
0.30% under IT and from -0.08% to 0.06% under PT. Thus, the variation in average welfare eﬀects
is much smaller under PT than IT over the same range of shocks. In comparison, with the current
demographic structure, these respective numbers change from 0.30% to -0.25% under IT and from
0.19% to -0.15% under PT. Even though the variation is still smaller under PT than IT, there is
much less diﬀerence in the ranges between the two regimes. This implies that, as population ages,
the variation of average welfare under PT becomes increasingly smaller than under IT.
8 Conclusion
We have documented that there are substantial diﬀerences in portfolio holding between diﬀerent
household groups as well as between diﬀerent sectors of the economy. As a result of these diﬀerences,
a price-level shock can create redistributions among agents. The extent of these redistributions
depend on the monetary policy in place. We studied the redistributional implications under inﬂation
targeting and price-level targeting and found that the extent of redistributions is much larger under
IT than PT.
Based on these redistributions, we have demonstrated that there are substantial diﬀerences in
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arise from the redistributive eﬀect of inﬂation and the fact that the diﬀerent policies imply diﬀerent
levels of correction following a surprise inﬂation. The channels through which this happens are the
changes in the real value of the public debt together with ﬁscal policy to confront them and the
changes in the wealth distribution due to the diﬀerent portfolios of various households groups. The
wealth redistribution among diﬀerent households leads them to respond in labour supply diﬀerently
to aﬀect aggregate output. Overall, we ﬁnd that inﬂation targeting tends to have much larger eﬀects
than price level targeting on both aggregate output and welfare.
For future research, there is a need to address one shortcoming in our analysis, the assumption of
ﬁxed portfolios of households. Analyzing how household portfolios change following the implemen-
tation of a PT regime is important in deriving more precise measures of redistributions, aggregate
and welfare eﬀects. Furthermore, it is also important to consider the process of price-level shocks,
rather than a one-time shock. Although the welfare analysis with one-time shocks in this paper gives
us insights on how bad these shocks are under diﬀerent monetary polices, it does not directly imply,
before the implementation of the policy, that one policy is preferred over the other. This is because
welfare over diﬀerent monetary policies should be with respect to all possible realizations of shocks




Survey of Financial Security The Survey of Financial Security (SFS) provides a comprehensive
picture of the balance sheet of Canadian households. Information was collected on the value of all
major ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial assets and on the money owing on mortgages, vehicles, credit cards,
student loans and other debts. We have used the 2005 wave of the SFS and the sample consists of
about 5,300 households.
National Balance Sheet Account The National Balance Sheet Accounts (NBSA) in Canada are
statements of the non-ﬁnancial assets owned/used in the sectors of the economy and of the ﬁnancial
claims outstanding among the economic units in the sectors in the economy. They consist of the
National Balance Sheet for the nation as a whole, as well as the underlying sector balance sheets.
The four broad sectors in NBSA consist of ”Persons and Unincorporated business”, ”Corporations
and Government Business Enterprises”, ”Government”, and ”Non-residents.” The data set reports
the market values of the assets and liabilities for 1990 and onwards.
Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics The Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) are
panel data based on a household survey from Statistics Canada, on Canadian persons and households
with information on employment, hours of work, education, family and personal income and work
transitions over life stages. There are several waves of the data set. The latest one covers the period
of 1999-2004. The sample for this wave consists of roughly 15,000 households.
Canadian Financial Monitor The Canadian Financial Monitor is a private database provided by
Ipsos Reid. It is based on a household survey in Canada. The sample consists of about 12,000
households every year starting in 1999. It provides detailed information across a wide range of
issues related to Canadian household ﬁnances. The scope of information includes chequing & saving
account detail, investment values and asset allocation, debt obligations, ﬁnancial service delivery
channels utilized and insurance coverage.
B Estimation of labour productivity
Table 6 shows the regression results from Section 5 using the SLID data set from Statistics Canada.
All the parameter estimates are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The numbers in Table 7 were calculated
by applying the average school years and the average work experience for each group to obtain the
average wage rate for the group. The numbers are normalized by the wage rate of the poor and ≤35
household group.
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34Table 1: Nominal and real positions as % of net worth by age and income class
Age Cohort
Type of instrument ≤ 35 36-45 46-55 56-65 66-75 > 75
All households
Short 4.83 -1.01 1.48 2.40 9.00 12.27
Mortgage -37.95 -13.57 0.07 4.48 3.55 3.29
Bond -2.63 4.70 6.50 7.90 6.70 7.68
Pension -0.05 -1.31 5.01 7.36 8.68 8.65
Total NNP -35.80 -11.19 13.06 22.14 27.93 31.89
Real 135.80 111.19 86.94 77.86 72.07 68.11
Rich households
Short 3.86 -3.73 -1.97 -2.36 8.48 8.57
Mortgage -11.31 4.71 12.92 13.66 7.15 5.71
Bond 7.71 9.72 11.73 13.00 10.50 12.37
Pension -2.92 -8.53 -6.25 -6.77 1.38 3.18
Total NNP -2.66 2.16 16.43 17.53 27.51 29.82
Real 102.66 97.84 83.57 82.47 72.49 70.18
Middle-class households
Short 5.83 2.24 4.40 5.49 9.06 14.91
Mortgage -81.62 -35.43 -11.11 -2.91 1.62 1.70
Bond -18.11 -0.90 2.16 4.10 4.56 4.56
Pension 4.46 7.63 15.96 19.36 14.11 12.71
Total NNP -89.44 -26.47 11.40 26.04 29.36 33.88
Real 189.44 126.47 88.60 73.96 70.64 66.12
Poor households
Short 18.90 -0.06 5.04 13.84 12.58 10.95
Mortgage -37.77 -19.44 -9.39 2.35 -2.56 2.10
Bond -37.66 -3.53 0.17 2.59 1.40 6.06
Pension 4.42 -4.09 0.92 1.95 2.73 4.63
Total NNP -52.11 -27.13 -3.26 20.73 14.15 23.75
Real 152.11 127.13 103.26 79.27 85.85 76.25
35Table 2: Nominal positions as % of GDP by sector
Sectors Households Government Foreigners
Short 12.25 -7.60 -4.65
Mortgage -11.94 3.19 8.75
Bond 22.14 -29.67 7.53
Pension 17.69 -8.91 -8.79
NNP 40.14 -42.99 2.85
Real 327.42 31.92 12.72
Table 3: Gains and Losses as % of Net Worth with 1% Shock
Age cohort ≤ 35 36-45 46-55 56-65 66-75 > 75
Inﬂation targeting
All 0.35 0.11 -0.13 -0.22 -0.28 -0.32
Rich 0.03 -0.02 -0.16 -0.17 -0.27 -0.30
Middle class 0.89 0.26 -0.11 -0.26 -0.29 -0.34
Poor 0.52 0.27 0.03 -0.21 -0.14 -0.24
Price level targeting (6-year horizon)
All 0.06 0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.12 -0.17
Rich -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.12 -0.14
Middle class 0.19 0.07 -0.01 -0.07 -0.12 -0.19
Poor 0.03 0.06 -0.01 -0.13 -0.11 -0.13
Price level targeting (15-year horizon)
All 0.23 0.10 -0.03 -0.13 -0.20 -0.25
Rich 0.02 -0.01 -0.09 -0.12 -0.20 -0.22
Middle class 0.58 0.22 0.02 -0.13 -0.20 -0.27
Poor 0.27 0.16 0.03 -0.17 -0.13 -0.19
36Table 4: Redistribution of Wealth across Sectors as % of GDP with 1% Shock
Households Sectors Government Foreigners
Net Gains Losses
Inﬂation targeting 0.43 -0.03 -0.40 2.56 -2.95
Price level targeting (6-year horizon) 0.14 0.01 -0.15 1.15 -1.29
Price level targeting (15-year horizon) 0.22 -0.03 -0.19 1.70 -1.89
Table 5: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Target
Preferences
σ 2 RBC literature
η3 0.64 33.1% of time at work
η2 0.55 40.9% of time at work
η1 0.61 42.7% of time at work
β3 1.1010 Wealth of rich
Wealth of middle class = 6.54
β2 1.0110 Wealth of middle class
Annual GDP per HH = 2.4
β1 0.9910 Wealth of middle class
Wealth of poor = 3.8
ξ3 0.012
Bequest
Average wealth = 0.088
Demography
s4 0.547 Fraction of Retirees = 0.17
s5 0.500 Size of ≥76
Size of 66-75 = 0.5
Technology
α 0.33 RBC literature
δ 0.52 7% annual depreciation
Government
τ 0.301 Tax revenue
GDP = 0.32
Tretired 0.039 Retirement Income Transfer
GDP per HH = 0.13













Number of observations 57360
Note: (∗) indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level. (1) Number of years working as full-time.
Table 7: Relative Labour Productivity
≤35 36-45 46-55 56-65
Poor 1.00 1.52 1.67 1.49
Middle Class 1.12 1.70 1.87 1.67
Rich 1.30 2.03 2.25 2.11
38Table 8: Welfare Eﬀects Based on Redistribution in 2005 for Diﬀerent Fiscal Policies under IT with
1% Shock
Tax Cuts Higher Lump-sum Higher Retirement
Transfer Income Transfer
Age Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich
≤35 0.054 0.101 0.084 0.051 0.078 0.040 0.018 0.048 0.008
36-45 0.070 0.107 0.030 0.062 0.084 0.007 0.037 0.065 -0.011
46-55 0.032 0.002 -0.141 0.051 0.002 -0.136 0.043 0.007 -0.145
56-65 -0.051 -0.116 -0.171 0.005 -0.081 -0.150 0.019 -0.058 -0.154
66-75 -0.200 -0.175 -0.180 0.150 -0.109 -0.161 2.045 0.300 -0.057
≥76 -0.286 -1.099 -0.200 0.223 -0.589 -0.175 2.943 2.130 -0.039
Total -0.055 -0.015 0.195
Table 9: Welfare Eﬀects Based on Redistribution in 2005 for Diﬀerent Fiscal Policies under PT with
1% Shock and six-year Horizon
Tax Cuts Higher Lump-sum Higher Retirement
Transfer Income Transfer
Age Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich
≤35 0.011 0.022 0.013 0.025 0.026 0.010 0.028 0.032 0.003
36-45 0.016 0.026 0.023 0.027 0.029 0.020 0.043 0.045 0.016
46-55 0.003 0.003 -0.018 0.024 0.014 -0.011 0.056 0.045 -0.007
56-65 -0.029 -0.036 -0.034 0.006 -0.013 -0.026 0.072 0.042 -0.019
66-75 -0.122 -0.073 -0.078 0.009 -0.036 -0.070 0.727 0.172 -0.029
≥76 -0.151 -0.609 -0.089 0.027 -0.430 -0.080 0.999 0.542 -0.031
Total -0.034 -0.009 0.094
Table 10: Welfare Eﬀects Based on Redistribution in 2005 for Tax Cut Policy under Diﬀerent Target
Horizons with 1% Shock
IT PT15 PT06
Age Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich
≤35 0.054 0.101 0.084 0.021 0.051 0.040 0.011 0.022 0.013
36-45 0.070 0.107 0.030 0.031 0.065 0.015 0.016 0.026 0.023
46-55 0.032 0.002 -0.141 0.012 0.018 -0.074 0.003 0.003 -0.018
56-65 -0.051 -0.116 -0.171 -0.044 -0.064 -0.117 -0.029 -0.036 -0.034
66-75 -0.200 -0.175 -0.180 -0.163 -0.120 -0.132 -0.122 -0.073 -0.078
≥76 -0.286 -1.099 -0.200 -0.224 -0.887 -0.150 -0.151 -0.609 -0.089
Total -0.055 -0.045 -0.034
39Table 11: Welfare Eﬀects Based on Redistribution in 2005 for Diﬀerent Fiscal Policies under IT and
PT with a Range of Shocks
Shocks Tax Lump-sum Retirement
Change Transfer Income Transfer
Inﬂation targeting
-5% 0.295 0.154 -0.698
-2% 0.132 0.070 -0.233
-1% 0.080 0.045 -0.063
1% -0.055 -0.015 0.195
2% -0.104 -0.037 0.334
5% -0.247 -0.109 0.725
Price level targeting (six-year horizon)
-5% 0.190 0.139 -0.103
-2% 0.091 0.070 0.015
-1% 0.048 0.043 0.041
1% -0.034 -0.009 0.094
2% -0.065 -0.033 0.119
5% -0.151 -0.099 0.186
Table 12: Welfare Eﬀects Based on Redistribution in 2005 for Diﬀerent Fiscal Policies under PT
with 1% Shock and six-year Horizon, Short Instruments in Bonds
Tax Cuts Higher Lump-sum Higher Retirement
Transfer Income Transfer
Age Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich
≤35 0.005 0.015 0.011 0.023 0.025 0.012 0.030 0.035 0.009
36-45 0.008 0.020 -0.004 0.025 0.028 -0.001 0.044 0.048 -0.001
46-55 0.002 0.004 -0.032 0.023 0.019 -0.023 0.062 0.052 -0.021
56-65 -0.016 -0.024 -0.049 0.021 -0.001 -0.040 0.089 0.057 -0.034
66-75 -0.053 -0.046 -0.045 0.058 -0.010 -0.039 0.600 0.165 -0.007
≥76 -0.083 -0.332 -0.053 0.064 -0.186 -0.046 0.778 0.528 -0.010
Total -0.019 0.006 0.093
40Table 13: Welfare Eﬀects Based on Redistribution in 2005 for Diﬀerent Fiscal Policies under IT with
1% Shock, With Demographic Change
Tax Cuts Higher Lump-sum Higher Retirement
Transfer Income Transfer
Age Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich
≤35 0.357 0.435 0.109 0.272 0.279 0.049 0.020 0.087 -0.011
36-45 0.415 0.426 0.002 0.287 0.261 -0.025 0.058 0.096 -0.070
46-55 0.281 0.145 -0.263 0.237 0.073 -0.245 0.013 -0.079 -0.278
56-65 -0.019 -0.139 -0.272 0.093 -0.082 -0.245 -0.141 -0.230 -0.271
66-75 -0.113 -0.240 -0.238 0.173 -0.072 -0.216 0.830 0.315 -0.166
≥76 -0.185 -0.299 -0.220 0.247 -0.059 -0.196 1.192 0.467 -0.144
Total 0.048 0.076 0.127
Table 14: Welfare Eﬀects Based on Redistribution in 2005 for Diﬀerent Fiscal Policies under PT
with 1% Shock and six-year Horizon, With Demographic Change
Tax Cuts Higher Lump-sum Higher Retirement
Transfer Income Transfer
Age Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich
≤35 0.116 0.135 -0.007 0.092 0.082 -0.011 0.007 0.019 -0.021
36-45 0.134 0.134 0.004 0.093 0.078 0.004 0.018 0.024 -0.007
46-55 0.079 0.059 -0.057 0.066 0.036 -0.047 0.003 -0.004 -0.052
56-65 -0.052 -0.044 -0.073 -0.012 -0.022 -0.066 -0.064 -0.058 -0.069
66-75 -0.091 -0.108 -0.113 0.020 -0.042 -0.104 0.289 0.116 -0.084
≥76 -0.111 -0.174 -0.110 0.051 -0.084 -0.101 0.430 0.127 -0.080
Total -0.003 0.011 0.044
41Table 15: Welfare Eﬀects Based on Redistribution in 2005 for Diﬀerent Fiscal Policies under IT and
PT with a Range of Shocks with Demographic Change
Shocks Tax Lump-sum Retirement
Change Transfer Income Transfer
Inﬂation targeting
-5% -0.358 -0.448 -0.702
-2% -0.130 -0.178 -0.275
-1% -0.058 -0.089 -0.136
1% 0.048 0.076 0.127
2% 0.113 0.159 0.255
5% 0.304 0.396 0.627
Price level targeting (six-year horizon)
-5% -0.075 -0.122 -0.215
-2% -0.022 -0.045 -0.079
-1% -0.005 -0.020 -0.039
1% -0.003 0.011 0.044
2% 0.011 0.035 0.078
5% 0.059 0.101 0.190
































































































































Figure 2: Lifecycle Labour, 1% shock, Labour Tax Reduction Policy under IT






















































































































































































































Figure 4: Lifecycle Labour, 1% shock, Labour Tax Reduction Policy under PT






















































































44Figure 5: Output and Asset, 1% shock, Labour Tax Reduction Policy under IT and PT














































Figure 6: Output and Asset, 1% shock, Labour Tax Rate Adjustment Period by Period under IT
and PT














































45Figure 7: Output and Asset, 1% shock, Lump-sum Transfer Policy under IT and PT














































Figure 8: Output and Asset, 1% shock, Transfer to Retirees Policy under IT and PT














































46Figure 9: Output and Asset, 1% shock, Labour Tax Reduction Policy under IT, PT6 and PT15
















































Figure 10: Output and Asset, 1% Shock, Labour Tax Reduction Policy under IT, with and without
Foreign Sector














































47Figure 11: Output, 1% shock, for Diﬀerent Policies and Diﬀerent Scenarios under PT, Diﬀerent
Portfolios







































































Figure 12: Output, 1% shock, for Diﬀerent Policies under IT and PT,With Demographic Change
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